Anthropology of Consciousness cognitive science regarding a second-order isomorphism between mental representation and elements of the natural world and of a perceptual cycle are consistent with ideas in shamanism regarding the relationships and interconnectedness of humans with elements ofthe natural world. Part II focuses on the idea of implicit (i.e., nonconscious) processing, and suggests ways in which implicit processing may be involved in shamanic cognition. Part III focuses on cognitive structures, and suggests how selected issues in modularity and in the evolutionary history of the mind may relate to shamanic experience. In addition to highlighting further correspondences and similarities of findings in cognitive science to views in shamanism, the discussion here also underscores the notion that many aspects of shamanic cognition are not fundamentally different from nonshamanic cognition.
The discussion here focuses on correspondences and similarities between shamanism and cognitive science at a basic cognitive level, and also builds upon the descriptions and ideas in Hubbard (2002) . Part I focuses on the notion of mental representation and the way mental representation reflects properties of the natural world, and suggests proposals in cognitive science regarding a second-order isomorphism between mental representation and elements of the natural world and of a perceptual cycle are consistent with ideas in shamanism regarding the relationships and interconnectedness of humans with elements ofthe natural world. Part II focuses on the idea of implicit (i.e., nonconscious) processing, and suggests ways in which implicit processing may be involved in shamanic cognition. Part III focuses on cognitive structures, and suggests how selected issues in modularity and in the evolutionary history of the mind may relate to shamanic experience. In addition to highlighting further correspondences and similarities of findings in cognitive science to views in shamanism, the discussion here also underscores the notion that many aspects of shamanic cognition are not fundamentally different from nonshamanic cognition.
Part I: Mental Images, Perception, and the World
Hubbard (2002) highlighted how properties of connectionist models of memory were similar to properties ofthe web of life; however, that discussion focused on the relationships of individual elements to other elements within such networks, and did not explicitly address the nature of those individual elements. A closer examination ofthe nature ofthe individual elements of cognition suggests that properties of the individual elements of mental representation may resemble properties ofthe natural world. Findings in cognitive science supporting this hypothesis will be reviewed, and how such a hypothesis might relate to elements of shamanic experience will then be discussed.
What is Mental Representation?
A "mental representation"refers to information (provided by either memory or perception) used or stored by a cognitive (mental) structure or process (e.g., see Markman 1998; Paivio 1986; Palmer 1978; Stich&Warfield 1999) . In general, information may be represented in any of a variety of different formats (e.g., images, verbal abstractions), and the specific format used for agi ven piece of information makes it more or less easy to represent or retrieve specific types of information with that representation (e.g., if the representation of a given apple involves a picture or an image, information regarding the specific shape and color of that apple is necessarily present in that depiction, but information regarding taxonomic classification is not necessarily present; however, if the representation of a given apple involves a verbal description, information regarding taxonomic classification might be present, but information regarding the specific shape and color of that apple might not be present; see Kosslyn's 1980 discussion of "description" and "depiction") . Although the numbers and types of formats used in or by mental representation are not universally agreed upon, many cognitive scientists accept the existence of at least two formats of mental representation: (a) a verbal, abstract, propositional, and descriptive format, and (b) a concrete, sensory, imagistic, and depictive format.
Visual Imagery
Verbal, abstract, propositional, or descriptive representations may be instantiated in network models, and Hubbard (2002) suggested properties of contemporary connectionist network models of semantic memory resembled properties of the web of life view of the natural world. However, it could be suggested that resemblances between propertiesof the natural world and properties of mental representation should be even more apparent if we consider less abstract or descriptive types of representation and more concrete or depictive types of representation. Indeed, some of the earliest evidence within cognitive science for P M.')) similarities and resemblances of properties of mental representation and properties of the natural world came from studies of concrete and sensory-like visual imagery. image to the referent physical object (i.e., to die object depicted by that image). An image ofa physical object is clearly not the same size, shape, and color as that object (e.g., a person who fonnsa visual image ofa greengiraffe would not have some neural structure within his or her head that is actually green and shaped like an giraffe, nor would mental rotation involve any actual rotation of neural cells), and so there is not a strong first-order isomorphism between the image and the referent object.
Mental
However, imagesdo preserve important functinal information about the structure of the imaged object (e.g., if points A and B were close in physical space, then imaged points A' and B' would be close in image space), and this weaker resemblance has been called a second-order isomorphism (see Shepard 1975 Shepard , 1981 . A second-order isomorphism preserves important functional information regarding the referent of the image, and the emphasis on functionalism within second-order isomorphism is consistent with Hubbard's (2002) but would not exhibit first-order isomorphism in which he or she physically transmuted from a human into a bird.
Displacements in Spatial Memory
Investigations and models of mental imagery have focused primarily on visual propertiesof objects (e.g., geometric aspects of space such as shape and distance), but many properties of the natural world are not visual properties. It could be argued that if properties of mental representation resemble properties of the natural world, then physical principles and forces that describe the functioning of the natural world should also describe the functioning of mental representations of the natural world. More concretely, physical principlesand forces that describe or constrain the behavior of objects in the natural world should be reflected within the architecture of mental representation, and this should constrain the representation of the stimulus. Indeed, evidence suggestive of such constraints has been found, as the mental representation of a given stimulus is often biased in ways consistent with subjective effects of physical principles that would have operated on the referent physical stimulus (Hubbard 1999) .
implied Physical Principles. Memory for the final position of a moving target is usually displaced in the direction of anticipated motion (for review, see Hubbard, 1995 Hubbard, ,2003 . In many studies onthis topic, observers viewed computer-animated displays in which a moving target was would not themselves be in motion. However, mental representation does preserve important functional information about the consequences of physical principles that act on physical objects. Much as visual imagery appears to reflect a second-order isomorphism between geometricpropertiesof physical objects and propertiesof the mental imagesof those objects, the mental representation of the spatial position of an object appears to reflect an analogous second-order isomorphism between properties of physical principles that would act upon that object and properties of that mental representation. This notion has been called the en vironmental invariants hypothesis (Hubbard, 1999) , and is consistent with the idea that properties of mental representation resemble properties of the natural world.
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Mental Representation and theWorld
A second-order isomorphism of spatial and dynamic properties of mental images with spatial and dynamic properties of physical objects is consistent with the hypothesis that propertiesof mental representation resemble properties of the environment (Shepard 1984 (Shepard , 1994 or have been shaped by the environment (Hubbard 1995 (Hubbard , 1999 . The idea that properties of mental representation resemble properties of the environment suggests an interplay of mental representation and the environment, and a way that mental representation The perceptual cycle as it was originally proposed suggested a flow of information and influence in only one direction. However, the discussion in Hubbard (2002) focused on how meaning was extended into the world, and the environmental invariants hypothesis, as well as the proposal of a second-order isomorphism between images and referent objects,
suggests that the flow of information and influence might be more bi-directional and symmetrical: not only is meaning extended from mental representation into the natural world, but properties of the natural world are extended into mental representation. Thus, connections and influences between cognition and the natural world are from the individual to elements of the natural world (as illustrated by the notion that connectionist networks put meaning "out in the world" discussed in Hubbard 2002; see also Hardy 1998) and from elements of the natural world to the individual (as illustrated by the sensitivity of imagery and spatial memory to functional and dynamic properties of the natural world discussed here). Humans participate in cognitive interactions with the natural world: properties of mental representation resemble properties of the represented objects and properties of the natural world, and functional characteristics of the natural world appear to be incorporated into mental representation. Such a conclusion is consistent with cognitive science and with shamanism, and significantly deepens the correspondences and similarities noted in Hubbard (2002) .
Part II:The Unconscious (Implicit) Mind
There is a growing consensus within cognitive science that a significant portion of cognitive processing occurs in the absence of any conscious awareness of that processing (e.g., Graf and Masson 199 3; Stadler and Frensch 1997) , and that perception, learning, and retrieval from memory may all occur without conscious awareness (e.g., Kirsner, Speelman, Maybery.O'Brien-Malone, Anderson, and MacLeod 1998). Furthermore, individuals are often unaware of the true causes of much of their behavior, and may fabricate explanations that appear plausible but are demonstrably false (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson 1977) ; similarly, in"trance logic"hypnotized subjects often invent reasons for their behaviors or perceptual experiences (e.g., Orne, 1959 ; but see Spanos, 1986) . Given connotations associated with the terms a subconscious,""preconscious,"and"unconscious,"many theorists prefer the term "implicit" when referring to cognitive processes that occur without (or in the absence of) conscious awareness and the term"explicit" when referring to cognitive processes that occur within (or accompanied by) conscious awareness. Given the importance of implicit processes in nonshamanic cognition, it could be suggested that implicit processes might be important in shamanic cognition.
Implicit Connections to the NaturalWorld
The existence of meaningful connections within neural networks need not depend upon conscious awareness of those connections; indeed, the presence of priming (i.e., when a previously perceived stimulus facilitates the processing of a subsequently perceived stimulus) when aperson does not consciously remember having been previously exposed to the initial stimulus is usually interpreted as evidence of implicit memory for that initial stimulus (e.g.,Tulving and Schacter 1990). More generally, humans may not have conscious 
Soul Flight and Soul Retrieval
If shamanic experience involves cognitive processes that are normally implicit, then in voyaging between ordinary reality and an Upper or LowerWorld, a shaman may (also) be voyaging between the conscious mind and different regions of the unconscious mind. The "soul flight" that often characterizes shamanism (e.g., see Eliade 1964) may reflect an application of consciousness or conscious processing to normally unconscious information.
Different unconscious structures or processes may subjectively manifest in conscious experience as different types of archetypes. Within shamanic systems, these archetypes may appear as different types of entities (e.g., animals,gods, or other beings) encountered during shamanic experience, and these different entities usually each have different powers and gifts or teach different lessons. Under such an interpretation, a "loss of soul" might reflect a weakened or depleted archetype, and"soul retrieval" might involve a conscious re-energizing or balancing of that archetype. Thus, retrieval of a lost or missing soul may be metaphorical for consciously accessing or strengthening previously unconscious information. Shamanic experience would briefly expose elements of the unconscious mind to a more conscious or attentive processing (cf., Berman 2000; Winkelman 2000 ), and such a heightened level of conscious attention to normally unconscious material would be consistent with mythic accounts of Orpheus, Dante, and others who descended into a lower world for healing or to retrieve someone or something. Interestingly, such an account suggests shamanic healing might be effective because it follows the Freudian dictum of making the unconscious conscious, and is also consistent with the Socratic dictum to "know thyself."
AGaian Speculation
To the extent that specific elements of shamanic experience reflect biological potentials (cf . Winkelman 1997) , those elements of shamanic experience should be similar for all members of a given species. The idea of a similar or shared unconscious experience is reminiscent of the "collective unconscious" proposed by Jung (1970) and which consists of a"species memory"containing archetypal patterns and other memories and experiences common to all humankind. It is but a small step from Jung's idea of a collective unconscious that connects members of the same species to a broader and deeper memory that connects members of different species. Such a broader and deeper memory could appropriately be considered a"Gaian"unconscious (based on the"Gaia" notion of the web of life and how life on Earth is interconnected with and regulates its environment; see Lovelock 1979 Lovelock , 1988 . 
Part III: Cognitive Structures
As many have observed, evolution of the human cortex is built upon more primitive brain structures (e.g., the "reptilian," "paleomammalian," and "neomammalian" triune division proposed by MacLean 1973 MacLean , 1990 , and the extremely high overlap in DN A across species makes it quite probable that shared elements of cognitive processing exist across species. More specifically, to the extent that archetypal structures are physiologically based (cf. Stevens 1982), such cognitive content (e.g., archetypes or a Gaian unconscious) might be shared with nonhuman animals that possessed the relevant physiological structures. The overlap in brain structures and in genetic material, in conjunction with the notion that implicit or unconscious learning is a phy logenetically earlier form of learning than is explicit or conscious learning (see Reber 1993) , suggests that unconscious structures or processes might be related to evolutionary older brain structures found in both humans and nonhuman animals. If such reasoning is correct, and given some of the possible roles of the unconscious in shamanic experience that were considered earlier, then a further understanding of the cognitive aspects of shamanism might be gleaned from a brief consideration of some issues regarding the evolution of the human mind.
Cognitive Archeology and Evolutionary Psychology
The emerging paradigms of cognitive archeology (e.g., Mithen 1996; Pearson 2002) , 1995) , and evolutionary psychology (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 1992,1994) emphasize that human brains reflect the environments within which the evolution of early humans occurred. Thus, human brains were shaped by natural selection, and the properties and characteristics of human brains today reflect the problems and challenges encountered by hunter-gatherer human ancestors 6 . To the extent that there are similarities in the cortical and subcortical structures of humans and nonhuman animals, and similarities in the environmental stimuliencountered (and cognitively processed) by humans and nonhuman animals, we might expect there to be similarities in the cognitive experiences of humans and nonhuman animals. Such similarities in cognitive experiences would be consistent with the attribution of human-like beliefs, desires, and mental states to nonhuman elements of the natural world discussed in Hubbard (2002) . Indeed, the emphasis on continuities between human cognition and nonhuman cognition in theories that are based on evolutionary principles underscores yet another area in which ideas from contemporary cognitive science exhibit correspondences and similarities with ideas from shamanism;
namely, that humans (and human cognition) are points along a continuum rather than discrete entities unconnected with the rest of terrestrial life and experience.
Modularity of Mind
Theories of mind based on considerations of the demands faced by the evolving brain usually suggest that human minds are more like a collection of highly specialized modules and less like a blank slate or general purpose computer; in other words, the mind is considered to be more analogous to a "Swiss army knife" with an myriad of different specialized blades and appliances and less analogous to & single generalized multipurpose tool. Such an organizational scheme could be quite adaptive, because having specialized modules could increase the speed and efficiency of problem solving, and thus lead to an increased probability of survival and reproduction. We might thus expect natural selection to favor the application of modules in problem solving situations. Indeed, such a modular approach is not limited to the "primitive mind," but may characterize the "contemporary mind" as well (for discussionsof modularity, see Fodor 1983; Garfield 1991) . 7 Although the precise number and content of modules varies from theory to theory, many researchers postulate the existence of a specialized module for processing information related to social knowledge and interaction (e.g., Mithen 1996) or to biological or animate forms (e .g., Atran 114 ( processing within a module is not influenced by any other beliefs, knowledge, or expectations ofthat organism (i.e., once information is input into a module, no information from outside that module can influence the processing within that module, see Fodor 1983) . Such an integration of knowledge asWinkelman refers to might indeed occur, but that integration might rely on the outputs of modular processing rather than on an integration of modular processing. In contrast, the role of modularity suggested here is a simpler one that does not involve an integration of modules or of different types of information, but rather involves the application of a single module specialized for processing information related to social knowledge and social interaction.
Dynamic Mental Representation
Early metaphors of cognition in cognitive science were based on the digital serial computer, and so considered mental representations as relatively static"dataarrays"operated on by various processes or mapped from one structure to another structure. However, more contemporary theorizing in cognitive science rejects the view that mental representations are static and posits a more dynamic character to mental representation (e.g., Freyd 1987; Jones and Boltz 1989; Kelso 1995; Port and van Gelder 1995) . Indeed, the interplay of mental representation and the environment described by the perceptual cycle is consistent with the emerging view that mental representations are more appropriately conceived of as dynamic processes rather than as static entities, and the interrelatedness and mutual influence suggested by the perceptual cycle are consistent with the dynamic nature of the web of life. Furthermore, arguments presented here and in Hubbard (2002) 
Notes
'In discussing transmutation, broader aspects of magical thinking may also appear relevant. For example, it might be objected that the appearance of resemblances between properties of mental representation and properties of the natural world might reflect magical thinking and application of the law of similarity as discussed in Hubbard (2002) . However, such criticism overlooks a critical point: the properties of mental representation discussed here are replicable Findings from carefully controlled laboratory experimentation, and only after a sufficient mass of data accumulated was the notion of secondorder isomorphism proposed.
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Such a resemblance might initially seem obvious or trivial, but it is possible that other relationships between mental representation and the natural world could have occurred. Indeed, when the nature of representation is considered more broadly, the majority of non-mental forms of representation do not incorporate explicit information about physical principles or forces that would act upon the represented object (e.g., a videotape of an automobile crash would not contain or incorporate the force of the collision), and so experimental findings that mental representation does contain or incorporate such information tells us something interesting about the relationship between mental representation and the natural world.
'Of course, the outward forms of gods, spirits, and others encountered during a shamanic experience may be specified in large measure by the culture of the person who is having that shamanic experience (e.g., a Native American may encounter animals, a Christian may encounter saints and martyrs of the Church, and a Buddhist may encounter buddhas and boddhisattvas), but the core essence of those landmarks may be specified by unconscious structures or processes.
•in what has become a paradigm study of the effects of expertise on memory, experimental participants varying in expertise in chess were briefly shown chessboards containing various configurations of chess piece*, and those participants were subsequently provided with empty chessboards and asked to reconstruct the configuration* of the chess pieces (reviewed in Holding 198S). When configurations were of plausible game positions or were drawn from a real game, chess masters outperformed chess novices because the chess masters could draw on their knowledge of typical configurations to maximize the number of pieces they could encode (e.g., a king behind three pawns could be encoded as a "castled king" by a chess master knowledgeable about typical configurations, and that would require only one "chunk" of memory, whereas that same configuration might require four "chunks" of memory, one for each piece, by a novice who would not recognize that configuration), and this allowed chess masters to encode the locations of mure total pieces. By analogy, a person with expertise in shamanism might appear to encode or be .sensitive to more total information regarding his or her environment, and this could result in such a person being more likely to encode whatever information was necessary for successful completion of a given task. S A similar example may be found when we consider memory for nocturnal dreams. Laboratory research has clearly shown that people dream during the episodes of REM sleep that occur 3-4 times per night; however, most people fail to remember the majority of their dreams (e.g., see Dement 1972; Hobson 1988) 'Such an approach is not necessarily typical of nor consistent with traditional approaches in psychological science that stress the idea of association (e.g., in traditional behaviorism, the emphasis on reinforcement as the primary determinant of learning; in classical cognitivism, the emphasis on top-down effects of schematic activation and categorical knowledge on the interpretation of stimuli) and that brains are like blank slates or general purpose computers capable of mapping any set of stimuli onto any other set of stimuli. As Hubbard (2002) noted, it is with more contemporary connectionist models of semantic memory (rather than in earlier hierarchical or spreading activation models) that we see a greater convergence of ideas from cognitive science and ideas from shamanism; similarly, it is with more contemporary evolutionary models (rather than in earlier associationist models) that we see a greater convergence of ideas from cognitive science and ideas from shamanism.
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A similar idea may be found in recent theories suggesting humans have "multiple intelligences.* Although not "modules" in a technical sense, the list of separate "intelligences" often includes an intelligence that involves social interaction (e.g., an "interpersonal intelligence" that involves processing of information regarding other people's moods, temperament, motivations, and intentions, and an "intrapersonal intelligence" that involves understanding, using, and interpreting one's own emotions; see Gardner 1983 ).
